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Abstract: China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is the largest infrastructure scheme in our lifetime,
bringing unprecedented geopolitical and economic shifts far larger than previous rising powers.
Concerns about its environmental impacts are legitimate and threaten to thwart China’s ambitions,
especially since there is little precedent for analysing and planning for environmental impacts
of massive infrastructure development at the scale of BRI. In this paper, we review infrastructure
development under BRI to characterise the nature and types of environmental impacts and demonstrate
how social, economic and political factors can shape these impacts. We first address the ambiguity
around how BRI is defined. Then we describe our interdisciplinary framework for considering the
nature of its environmental impacts, showing how impacts interact and aggregate across multiple
spatiotemporal scales creating cumulative impacts. We also propose a typology of BRI infrastructure,
and describe how economic and socio-political drivers influence BRI infrastructure and the nature
of its environmental impacts. Increasingly, environmental policies associated with BRI are being
designed and implemented, although there are concerns about how these will translate effectively
into practice. Planning and addressing environmental issues associated with the BRI is immensely
complex and multi-scaled. Understanding BRI and its environment impacts is the first step for China
and countries along the routes to ensure the assumed positive socio-economic impacts associated
with BRI are sustainable.
Keywords: China; Belt and Road Initiative; BRI; One Belt One Road; infrastructure; environmental
impacts; environmental impact assessment; transboundary conservation; silk road
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1. Introduction
China’s “Going Out” strategy has culminated in what will be the largest infrastructure scheme in
our lifetime—the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI; initially known as “One Belt One Road” or OBOR),
announced by President Xi Jinping in 2013 [1]. The BRI comprises six overland and one maritime
economic cooperation corridors, which are expected to connect around half of the world’s population
and over 60 countries [2]. Infrastructure projects are the most prominent component of BRI, which will
feature various cooperation mechanisms under the “Five Connectivities” of policy, infrastructure, trade,
finance and socio-cultural connectivity [3]. BRI has been heralded as a new phase of globalisation,
which will integrate inland and maritime economies, unlike the previous phases of globalisation which
were primarily maritime-based [4]. Consequently, it will carve out a Eurasian continental and maritime
geostrategic realm for China [5]. Although BRI is trumpeted as fulfilling the Chinese dream of national
revitalisation and the creation of a regional “community of common destiny” [4], it indubitably serves
strategic and domestic goals, such as developing the Western and Central parts of China and creating
overseas investment opportunities for state-owned enterprises [6].
Chinese BRI investments are projected to exceed $1 trillion, dwarfing all previous
geopolitically-motivated American and Soviet spending [7]. The economic effects of these investments
are rapidly being seen. For instance, Liu et al. [8] found that BRI mechanisms have stimulated more
Chinese outward investments to BRI countries than non-BRI countries. However, concerns about the
environmental impacts of BRI are rife [9–12], which Chinese academics have recognised as a possible
hindrance to China’s BRI ambitions [13,14]. In response, four Chinese ministries released a circular
“Guidance on Promoting Green Belt and Road” to all government departments in 2017, followed by
another circular from the Ministry of Ecology and Environment entitled “Plan for Cooperation in
Ecological and Environmental Protection for the Belt and Road Initiative” [15]. Since then, hundreds of
papers have been published in Chinese academic journals on environmental law, policy and financing
for BRI [16], mostly theoretical rather than empirical. The research on the environmental impacts of
BRI especially in English language international peer-reviewed scientific journals is sparse. Given the
importance of a scientific evidence-based approach, which the Chinese government and academics have
also recognised [17], it is necessary to understand the environmental impacts of BRI as a prerequisite
for effective policy-making which encourages environmental and social sustainability.
There is little precedent for addressing environmental impacts of massive infrastructure
development at the scale of BRI. Most environmental research and policy on development impacts
such as mining or dams or regional development is still confined along disciplinary lines and to
specific sites, although there is increasingly an emphasis on adopting a systemic perspective [18],
taking into account characteristics of complex and interconnected systems [19,20] such as cumulative
impacts [21,22]. For example, Chinese economists have attempted to model economic variables and
national-level environmental indicators for BRI countries [23–25]. However, data is often lacking for
most BRI routes, so far research has been focused on regions in China where data is available (e.g., [26]).
China has recognised this and is pushing for ‘big data’ information-sharing platforms for BRI [13].
There is a need to assess the key social, political and environmental dimensions [27–29] of BRI impacts,
whilst recognising the data limitations and methodological challenges inherent in reconciling the
natural and social sciences [30].
In this paper, we review infrastructure development under BRI to characterise the nature and
types of environmental impacts and demonstrate how social, economic and political factors can
shape these impacts. Drawing on environmental and geographical approaches, our objectives are
to: (1) define what BRI is and what makes an infrastructure project part of it, (2) define the different
types of infrastructure development associated with BRI and the associated environmental impacts on
different components of the Earth systems, (3) provide a typology of BRI infrastructure according to key
impact dimensions, (4) describe the role of social and economic drivers on BRI’s environmental impacts
and sustainability policies and (5) provide a framework to characterise BRI’s environmental impacts
using an interdisciplinary and multi-scale approach. The paper aims to address some of the ambiguity
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regarding the nature and impacts of the BRI and lay the groundwork for further interdisciplinary
study and planning on the BRI that accounts for the multi-scale nature of this trans-boundary initiative.
This is critical as the impacts of BRI are likely to be felt for many generations after the construction and
development of BRI projects are completed across the globe.
2. What is BRI?
BRI is driven primarily by infrastructure development along spatial corridors linking China with
various regions of Eurasia, motivated by geostrategic and economic development priorities [11,31].
Infrastructure is often defined and constrained by geopolitics [32–34]. Through spatial linkages
of people, goods, energy, and information, infrastructure can facilitate geopolitical aims such as
conquest, competition or cooperation [35]. This infrastructure is supported by, and facilitates,
other cooperation mechanisms such as policy coordination, trade, financial and socio-cultural
linkages [3]. Other development programmes undertaken by other powers such as the US, Russia or
Japan have been often geopolitically-motivated as well [36], but BRI differs from these investments by
being spatially concentrated along corridors designed with the express aim of facilitating trans-Eurasian
transport connectivity and integration with China. As such, the spatial dimensions of BRI impacts
are more notable than other distributed forms of globalisation or development and thus need to be
assessed as a whole rather than on a project by project basis.
A problem with much of the literature on the BRI is that the line between an infrastructure project
funded by China and a BRI project per se is often unclear. Projects with Chinese assistance take many
forms, such as investments, turnkey projects, technical cooperation, grants, aid and concessional loans,
with varying degrees of involvement from different Chinese actors [37,38]. Although the term ‘BRI’
is often applied loosely to just about any Chinese project in BRI countries [39], here we consider BRI
projects from a primarily spatial perspective as those supported by, or facilitating, clearly-defined
infrastructure corridors linking BRI countries with China. Projects not explicitly connected to a BRI
corridor in such a way are not considered to be BRI within this paper, regardless of financing or
motivation. Some of these projects may have started as independent projects and were later recognised
as BRI projects, but were located in those infrastructure corridors. Given our definition, Table 1
provides an example of the range of projects that have been characterised under the banner of BRI.
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Table 1. Examples and characteristics of infrastructure built for Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) for a range of BRI corridors.
Infrastructure
Type Country Route Examples Construction Area (sq km)
Total Length
(km) 1 Intensity Type
2 Ref
Transport
Road Kazakhstan New Eurasia Land Bridge Western Europe–Western China Highway 2008–2018 8445 8445 Med Linear [40]
Cambodia China–Indochina Peninsula EconomicCorridor Phnom Penh–Sihanoukville highway 2019–2023 190 190 Med Linear [41]
Rail Kyrgyzstan China–Central Asia–West Asia Corridor Uzbekistan–Kyrgyzstan-China railway TBC 250 500 Low Linear [42]
Laos,
Thailand
China–Indochina Peninsula Economic
Corridor
Kunming–Vientiane railway;
Vientiane–Bangkok high speed rail 2015–2022 908 1816 Low Linear [43,44]
Airport Pakistan China–Pakistan Economic Corridor Gwadar 2019–2022 17.4 4.2 Med Nodal [45]
Seaport 3 Kazakhstan New Eurasia Land Bridge Kuryk 2017–2022 1 1 Med Nodal [46]
Malaysia China–Indochina Peninsula EconomicCorridor Malacca 2014–2019 5.5 2.4 Med Nodal [47]
Sri Lanka Maritime Silk Road Hambantota 2008–2014 60.7 7.8 Med Nodal [48]
Energy
Power lines Pakistan China–Pakistan Economic Corridor Matiari–Lahore, Matiari–Faisalabad 2017–2021 203 2030 Low Linear [49]
Pipeline Mongolia China–Mongolia–Russia EconomicCorridor Russia–Mongolia–China pipeline TBC 500 1000 Med Linear [50]
Central Asia China–Central Asia–West Asia Corridor
Pan-Central Asia pipeline: Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,
Uzbekistan to China
2008 920 1840 Med Linear [51]
Myanmar Bangladesh–China–India-MyanmarEconomic Corridor Kyaukpyu–Kunming pipeline 2010–2017 385 770 Med Linear [52]
Coal plants Tajikistan China–Central Asia–West Asia Corridor Dushanbe 2012–2016 0.04 0.2 High Nodal [53]
Hydropower Pakistan China–Pakistan Economic Corridor Diamer–Bhasha dam (Indus River) 2011–2029 1200 140 High Nodal [49]
Wind farms Pakistan China–Pakistan Economic Corridor Gharo, Jhimpir, Cacho 2017 60 7.7 Low Nodal [49]
Solar farms Pakistan China–Pakistan Economic Corridor Quaid-e-Azam Bahawalpur 2014–2015 26 5.1 Low Nodal [49]
Economic
Special Economic
zone Kazakhstan New Eurasia Land Bridge
China–Kazakhstan Khorgos International
Border Cooperation Center 2010 5.6 2.4 Med Concentrated [54]
Pakistan China–Pakistan Economic Corridor Gwadar Free Trade Zone 2016–2018 25 5 Med Concentrated [55]
1 Linear infrastructure impact area was estimated based on infrastructure type—A 1 km-wide for road, 500 m wide band for rail and pipeline and 100 m for power lines. These values allow
for comparisons between infrastructure, but cumulative impacts of infrastructure can vary between 10 km and 80 km or more and can even cross nations [56,57]; 2 See Section 4.1 for a more
detailed discussion on linear, nodal and concentrated typologies; 3 Indicative values for area and length of impact derived from land-based footprint of port and associated developments.
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3. Nature of BRI Environmental Impacts
In this section, we define the different types of development associated with BRI and the
range of environmental impacts associated with each development type. Environmental impacts of
infrastructure projects are the product of interactions between the infrastructure and the receiving
environment. Using an Earth systems approach [58,59], we characterised how different types of
infrastructure development affect different components of the Earth systems: atmosphere, hydrosphere,
geosphere and biosphere (Table 2). Land-use changes, landscape connectivity, and emissions are the
primary impact pathways through which BRI infrastructure will impact a wide variety of natural
systems across Eurasia, across various spatiotemporal scales. Although human activities already
perturb most of Earth’s ecosystems directly [60,61], when natural processes are disrupted to the
extent that their inherent abilities to restore equilibrium are compromised—whether at the catchment
level [62], at the planetary level [63], or anything in between—Earth systems risk being substantially
and irreversibly destabilised. BRI infrastructure risks extending the human footprint into pristine
regions and aggravating the existing footprints [10], destabilising Earth systems at various scales.
The Earth systems approach illustrates BRI environmental impacts at and between multiple
scales. Atmospheric systems such as the East and South Asian monsoons [64] and the Central Asian
dust storms [65] have complex teleconnections across the globe, but are closely coupled with human
activities on land. For example, large-scale agricultural intensification and urbanisation in India were
shown to cause a reduction in rainfall during the South Asian monsoon [66,67]. On continental belt
routes, however, the degree of coupling between different spatial levels of the hydrosphere is weaker,
so river systems are often studied at the catchment-scale or reach-scale [68]. BRI infrastructure will
affect almost all of Eurasia’s largest river systems, such as the Mekong [69], and may exacerbate water
stress in regions like Central Asia [70]. The geosphere, comprising soils and rocks, serves as buffers,
filters, sources and sinks, but has a finite carrying capacity often exceeded by human activities [71,72].
Additionally, many BRI routes such as the Karakoram Highway pass through geodynamically active
areas, posing landslide risks [73]. Impacts on the biosphere, such as habitat degradation, fragmentation
and loss, affect the health and survival of organisms and ecosystems [74,75]. Direct impacts give rise
to a slew of secondary or indirect impacts. Apart from direct impacts, infrastructure development
facilitates successive indirect effects like poaching, logging, settlement and other human invasions; it is
thus imperative to “avoid the first cut”, especially for pristine regions [76]. One such threat from BRI is
the Russia–China Amur Bridge transport corridor, which dissects two nature reserves with old-growth
forests [12]. Crucially, many environmental systems exhibit threshold behaviour, absorbing impacts
before the threshold but destabilising rapidly once the threshold is exceeded, introducing additional
uncertainty [63,77].
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Table 2. A summarised review of key direct impacts associated with a range of infrastructure development.
Infrastructure Type Impact on Earth Systems e.g., Ref
Atmosphere Hydrosphere Geosphere Biosphere
Transport
Road Air pollution; dust; microclimaticeffects from warming; noise
Impede drainage;
pollution and sediments
in runoff; littering
Soil erosion; landslides
especially in mountainous
terrain
Habitat loss; edge and barrier effects,
particularly wider clearings; roadkills;
fragmentation; human and exotic species
invasions
[78,79]
Rail
Less local pollution as pollution
generated at power plant for
electric trains; noise
Contaminants in runoff Less than road but stillpresent; soil pollution
Similar to roads, including fragmentation
and barrier effects. Generally, less severe
than roads; limited stops reduce human
footprint
[79,80]
Airport Air pollution; acid rain; noise
Impede drainage;
chemical contaminants in
runoff; solid and
hazardous waste
Soil pollution Often affects floodplains, wetlands andcoasts; noise and light disturbance [81–83]
Seaport Local air pollution from ships andrefineries
Direct discharge of
pollutants Dredging and reclamation
Exotic species invasions from ballast
discharge; algal blooms from nutrient
runoff; mortality from ship strikes and
entanglement in waste
[84,85]
Energy
Pipelines Air pollution; noise Contaminants in runoff;risk of accidents Soil pollution
Habitat loss; fragmentation; human and
exotic species invasions [86]
Power lines
Electromagnetic disturbance;
redistribution of pollution to power
source
Contaminants in runoff
(mainly during
construction)
Soil pollution, compaction
(mainly during
construction)
Habitat loss; edge and barrier effects;
fragmentation; human and exotic species
invasions; avian/bat mortality
[87,88]
Hydropower
Heavy usage of energy-intensive
concrete, usually produced from
coal-fired plants; greenhouse gas
emissions from decomposing
biomass in reservoir
Alteration of river flow
and sediment transport
Higher water table affects
soil, can cause landslides
and soil erosion
Hydrological changes affect aquatic
ecosystem; submersion of vast swathes
of forest
[89,90]
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Table 2. Cont.
Infrastructure Type Impact on Earth Systems e.g., Ref
Atmosphere Hydrosphere Geosphere Biosphere
Coal plants Toxic air pollution; acid rain;greenhouse gases
Heavy metal
contamination; high water
usage; thermal pollution
Subsidence from lowering
of water table
Physical habitat destruction; air and
water pollutants [91,92]
Wind farms Significantly lower impact than fossil fuel power plants, but will still have life-cycle impacts Avian/bat mortality [93]
Solar farms Thermal pollution andmicroclimatic changes; glare effect
Reduced infiltration
capacity due to shading of
soil, potentially increasing
runoff
Soil sealing, shading and
degradation
Landscape alteration and habitat
fragmentation [94]
Economic
Special Economic
Zone Air pollution; noise
Impede
drainage–flooding risks;
pollution and sediments
in runoff
Soil erosion and pollution Habitat loss and fragmentation driven byland cover change and urbanisation [95,96]
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Multiple direct and/or indirect impacts can aggregate and interact to produce cumulative
impacts [21]. The cumulative impact dimension of BRI (Figure 1) is particularly significant because
BRI will concentrate infrastructure and other economic activities along its routes, while also dispersing
human activities to new or previously less accessible locations. While each direct impact can often be
reductively studied within the confines of one discipline, human actors and actions play a key role in
the cumulative dimension of impacts. Consequently, interdisciplinary cumulative impact modelling is
fraught with challenges and has yet to be widely done even at a local scale, let alone continental-scale
transformations like BRI [97].
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Figure 1. Multi-scale, socio-economic-political and environmental framework for planning and
addressing the impacts of BRI.
Cumulative impacts occur at multiple temporal and spatial scales. For example, air pollution and
anthropogenic climate forcing effects are determined by a confluence of factors, such as climate and
topology, and have effects ranging from microclimatic changes to regional phenomena like smog when
human activities are compounded. Substantial changes in the nature and spatial extent of human
activity brought about by BRI will have regional climatic effects and teleconnections on a global scale.
For example, Central Asian rangelands are carbon sinks of global importance [98], and there are
concerns that increasing BRI-facilitated industrial activity will affect regional climate [99], but these are
still poorly quantified.
Similarly, soil and hydrological conditions in BRI corridors interact with other Earth systems in
response to human activity. These risks may sometimes be unavoidable. For example, the Karakoram
Highway connecting Xinjiang, China to Gwadar Port, Pakistan passes through Himalayan regions
known for “very high geodynamic activity” such as earthquakes, landslides, glacial erosion and
unpredictable monsoons [73], but alternative routes are even more challenging. In the Aral Sea,
Central Asia, cumulative impacts from the socio-environmental interactions between mis-management,
over-irrigation and serious pollution causing water scarcity are magnified by “seriously dysfunctional”
transboundary management which has the potential to result in armed conflicts [70].
4. Typology of BRI Environmental Impact Drivers
Characterising the drivers of environmental impacts requires an understanding of multi-scale,
temporal and spatial characteristics of infrastructure development. Here, we attempt to provide a
typology of BRI i frastructure according to fu ction, causality, and spatiotemporal scale and intensity,
in order to underst nd the features of BRI infrastr ctur which define and interact with the impact
drivers and impact domain, especially through the context of the receiving environment. A key
requireme t for evide c -base strategic planning approaches and any form or modelling which
attempts to project impacts into the future is a shared understanding of the dimensions of these impacts.
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4.1. Function
The function of BRI infrastructure determines its features, particularly its spatial footprint on
the landscape and interactions with other impact drivers. The sub-discipline of transport geography
sees infrastructure as mediating flows of people, goods, information and energy [100]; infrastructure
imposes a structure on space across spatial scales spanning from local to global, determined by economic
links and relations [35]. Economic systems structure space, which impacts the environment through
the characteristics of the spatial footprint of infrastructure. Linear physical infrastructure, as frequently
mentioned in environmental impact literature (e.g., Reference [75]), extends long distances across space
to connect two places, while nodal infrastructure occupies a more focused area. Economic infrastructure
such as free trade zones serve to concentrate economic activity, while certain development initiatives
may serve to disperse economic activity [101,102]. The type and function of BRI infrastructure is
shown in Table 3. It is important to note that certain kinds of infrastructure may occupy more than
one category—for instance, a Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) terminal might be considered as both a
transport and energy infrastructure.
Table 3. Typology of BRI infrastructure according to type and function.
Category Type Examples PrimarilyPhysical Function
Transport Linear Road, rail Y Movement of people and goodsbetween settlements separated by space
Nodal Airports, seaports, railterminal Y
Serve as land-sea, land-air, and
land-land interface
Energy Linear Pipelines, power lines Y Energy transmission across space
Nodal Dams, coal, wind,solar, mines Y
Energy generation-convert energy
source into form suitable for human use
Communication Linear Fibre-optic cables Y* Movement of information betweensettlements separated by space
Nodal Receiving stations Y* Serve as network-network ornetwork-user interface
Economic Concentrated Special EconomicZones (SEZs) N
Concentrate economic activity in a
geographically-limited area
Dispersed
Development
incentives, financial
mechanisms
N Facilitate economic activity across awider region
* Communication infrastructure is physical, but physical distance and location have a less pronounced effect on the
network. Additionally, it has a smaller physical footprint and landscape impacts.
4.2. Causality
The wide-ranging scope of BRI projects, especially when spatially concentrated along corridors,
bring about complex causal relationships and interactions between different infrastructure types.
A simplified model of this is presented in Figure 2. Economic activities are dependent on
physical infrastructures (especially transport and energy), and increase demand for them [103,104].
Communications infrastructure often plays an “invisible” supporting role but can also stimulate certain
types of economic activity [105]. Other infrastructure which promotes economic activity, such as
Special Economic Zones (SEZs; [105]), can also be very influential in shaping economic activities and
interactions [106–108]. These interactions and causal relationships can be used to model possible BRI
activities and thus their cumulative impacts.
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4.3. Scale and Intensity of BRI Impacts
Infrastructure pes differ in the manner in which they modify the landscape and thus create
direct impacts. They also differ in how they create cumulative impacts by facilitating successive
development and modifying the behaviour of other actors interacting with the landscape. Impacts can
be considered as a function of immediate onsite footprint on the environment, which is the product of
its total impact area and total impact intensity [109,110], demonstrated in Figure 3 as a generalisation
for each “typical” project type. Nodal infrastructure (such as airports and seaports, see Section 4.1)
tends to be more spatially compact than linear infrastructure (such as roads) and tends to have a
smaller total impact area. However, long-distance road and rail projects may still have a higher
total impact intensity (i.e., disruption of Earth systems). Although there may not always be a choice
between different infrastructure types, limited by contextually-specific constraints, an awareness of
how different infrastructure types affect the environment differently can aid planning and mitigation
efforts. Taking a risk-based approach, the temporal and probabilistic characteristics could also be
considered. For example, oil spills from pipelines and tankers are infrequent but potentially very
damaging events to their receiving environments as well as having severe economic impacts.
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compactness of BRI infrastructure types.
A major infrastructure project often facilitates other development (Figure 4) and understanding
the dynamics of this temporally sequential process can shed light on how different developments
aggregate and interact over time to influence consequential impacts on the landscape. A large nodal
project, such as a dam, requires a series of supporting developments such as concrete factories,
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settlements and road networks, and thus spurs the construction of more linear infrastructures across the
landscape [76]. Alternatively, linear infrastructure may serve as a catalyst for nodal projects and more
linear infrastructure to form networks. On a smaller scale this may take the form of transit-oriented
developments [111]. For example, improved road and rail links between China and Kazakhstan,
especially through the Khorgos border area, laid the groundwork for the China-Kazakhstan Khorgos
SEZ [112]. Additionally, the Chinese-funded Karakoram Highway and Gwadar Port provide access
to the Indian Ocean from Xinjiang. This improved transport connectivity has accelerated industrial
development along the route [113,114].
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5. Economic Drivers and Environmental Impacts
Having already discussed direct and indirect impacts and drivers (i.e., what is happening on the
ground), in this section we examine economic drivers and benefits and relationship with environmental
impacts. The economic benefits of BRI infrastructure are driven primarily by increased trade in goods,
services and resources, facilitated by reduced transportation costs and other trade barriers. BRI is
projected to increase total exports of 46 BRI countries by $5 billion to $135 billion and GDP by 0.3
to 1.4 percent [2]. However, reduced trade barriers can cause jurisdictions with lax environmental
regulations to gain a comparative advantage, redistributing environmental impacts [115]. There are
fears that as trade barriers are lowered, China’s tightening environmental regulations may make
many BRI countries more attractive as pollution havens, a process which BRI may accelerate [116].
Heavily-polluting Chinese cement plants relocating to Tajikistan has been cited as one example of
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this [117]. Additionally, a logging moratorium in China’s Heilongjiang province caused spill-over
effects for forests abroad [12]. The extent to which this may be a problem has been questioned by
empirical evidence from the economic literature which suggests that only marginal firms relocate,
while most remain and comply with stricter laws [118]. In addition, trade-related changes in industrial
composition may facilitate production at lower relative emission intensities [119,120]. Suggesting an
interplay of these factors, an econometric study found evidence for the pollution haven effect in BRI
countries from non-Chinese investment but found that Chinese investment reduced emissions [121].
Trade also transforms techniques of production and consumption, changing income and thus
pollution levels [122]. According to the environmental Kuznets curve, pollution increases initially
as income grows, but above a turning point, pollution falls as higher incomes bring technological
improvements and increasing demand for environmental amenities. Although the evidence and
theory behind the environmental Kuznets curve is highly contentious [123–126], evidence suggests that
environmental policies, clean technology and economic liberalisation can help to flatten the Kuznets
curve [127,128].
Production techniques can improve through mechanisms such as technology transfer and
trade-induced innovation. Although China is the world’s largest CO2 emitter [129], increases in
research activity, technological advancement and the assimilation of foreign technology have played a
role in abating Chinese CO2 emissions [130]. Additionally, China is also the world’s largest investor
in renewables, and high levels of Chinese investment and production have reduced the costs of
renewable energy infrastructure [131]. By 2020, all Chinese coal plants will be more efficient and less
pollutive than every US coal plant [132]. BRI can facilitate overseas transfer of Chinese technology, with
concomitant environmental benefits [133]. China has upgraded Tajikistani and Kyrgyzstani coal plants
with newer technology [53,134], and signed deals to upgrade Bangladeshi coal mines, power grids and
factories [135].
Economic growth may increase the industrial pollution base, known as scale effects [136].
Negative scale effects and positive technique effects on the environment are difficult to isolate
empirically, and quantitative studies disagree on whether the scale or technique effect is larger [137,138].
Different pollutants also react differently to trade-related changes. For example, a Chinese study
combining scale and technique effects suggested that trade increased SO2 and dust fall but reduced
chemical oxygen demand, arsenic and cadmium [139]. This underscores the need for interdisciplinary
studies combining the macroeconomic perspective with the spatial and contextual nuance of
environmental science.
6. Socio-Political Drivers and Environmental Policies
As outlined above, BRI may cause foreseeable environmental impacts at a range of scales and
intensities. Actors associated with multiple social, administrative and political scales (from the local to
the global) will play a key role in moderating these environmental impacts [140]. While not the focus of
this paper, the social impacts of development considered through social impact assessments alongside
environmental impact assessments can have long-term negative effects on local communities [141].
Social drivers identify factors that contribute to and mediate environmental impacts, such as community
structures and institutions, people’s preferences, behaviour and capacity to influence change [142].
Chinese companies’ past record of alleged forced evictions and environmental degradation [143,144]
suggest that without local accountability the BRI is likely to face local resistance. Concerns about
environments, communities and livelihoods can galvanise civil society into action. In Kyrgyzstan,
for example, locals burnt down a BRI-supported Chinese gold-processing plant after their fears of
pollution were not sufficiently addressed [145]. Fears of local backlash and Chinese political pressure
can motivate Chinese corporations to take corporate social responsibility (CSR) more seriously with
recognition of community concerns. For example, China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC) opened
its procurement process for the Mombasa–Nairobi standard gauge railway to local contractors instead
of using only Chinese contractors, and consulted with wildlife experts to enable animals to cross the
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railway line safely [146]. However, social drivers of BRI environmental impacts are not limited only to
China and host countries. US and EU consumers are responsible for 30% of the carbon emissions in
BRI countries through embodied carbon flows [147].
The dominant role of the state in China means that its intents and actions are central to any
socio-political discussions and policies, and directly affect social drivers [148]. Crucially, Chinese political
will to think long-term on strategic issues recognises environmental problems as a threat. Since the
‘ecological civilisation’ concept was added to the constitution in 2012, it has featured prominently
in Chinese discourse regarding the environment and formulation of environmental policies [149].
Widespread dissatisfaction about environmental degradation has led policy makers to strengthen
environmental regulations [149,150]. China has also sought to improve environmental governance
frameworks and to engage stakeholders in resolving environmental conflicts and disputes. For example,
Quanzhou municipality set up an ecological compensation scheme for the Jin River catchment in Fujian
province. Downstream areas compensated upstream villages and local governments for taking measures
to conserve the catchment [151]. Encouragingly, local and state governments in China are working
to coordinate environmental policies at larger scales to resolve inter-jurisdictional environmental
issues [152]. There have been similar calls to develop ecological compensation frameworks for BRI [153].
China’s newfound concern for the environment is notable but benefits in BRI host countries remain to
be seen.
Although intended primarily for economic development, BRI mechanisms can provide a
platform for China and partner countries to promote cross-boundary environmental conservation and
environmental management [10]. This is urgently needed as BRI countries are already responsible
for 95% of global net embodied carbon exports [147]. Partly in response to foreign pressure,
China has outlined its policies to promote green development and environmental protection for
BRI [154]. This builds on the idea of a Green BRI described previously in a document co-issued by
government officials describing the promotion of green energy, sustainable agriculture, aquaculture
and forestry [155].
Guidelines also exist for specific areas that are relevant to BRI, some of which were developed
prior to BRI. Two documents on forestry provide guidance on environmental protection (e.g., avoiding
soil erosion, minimising noise and air pollution), and biodiversity conservation (e.g., conserving
habitats, protecting threatened species, enhancing sustainable forestry, etc.) for the Chinese enterprises
to integrate with environmental legislation and operations in host countries [156,157]. Other Chinese
and international documents provide more detailed country-specific recommendations [158].
These guidelines suggest China’s attempts to promote sustainable trade and green economy at
the international level [154]. These include calls for expanding cooperation with international agencies,
governments and non-governmental organisations around the environmental impacts of BRI [159].
However, some scholars and commentators are concerned that these policies will fail to translate
into practice. Potential problems include serious concerns about enforcing China’s environmental
regulations across multiple jurisdictions and scales as many environmental policies directed towards
China’s overseas investment are already non-binding [160]. Mechanisms rely upon host countries
laws to evaluate Chinese companies’ conduct yet enforcement is often weak [160]. Moreover, local
regulations and standards may be lower than those found in China (see also [9,161]) or have different
agendas [162]. Often, limited information sharing between China and host countries hampers
transnational enforcement efforts [160]. For Tracy et al. [12] the disjuncture between Chinese policy and
host countries’ poor environmental records means the BRI is an environmental ‘race to the bottom’.
Secondly, there are gaps in the application of China’s environmental policy. Most guidelines for
environmental protection in foreign investment and cooperation target China’s large state-owned
enterprises (SOEs). This overlooks the impact of private companies, particularly small and medium
enterprises (SMEs) [163]. SOEs will lead BRI initiatives over SMEs [40] yet private sector organisations
from China and elsewhere still play a key role [164,165]. It is these firms that are often responsible for
serious environmental degradation because SMEs are not as strictly regulated [161]. There remain
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questions about how China’s environmental policies compare to international standards. A coalition
of organisations led by the Green Finance Initiative [166] argues that projects deemed to be ‘green’ by
Chinese Catalogue standards may not be considered green by international guidelines.
In summary, while China has been developing environmental policies around the BRI, questions
remain as to how effective they will be. China stresses the improved economic value and global
infrastructure associated with the BRI, yet unequal power relationships between Chinese and host
nations along the road can cause contestation between sides. Too often misunderstanding in local
communities that shoulder the burden of debt, degradation, corruption and displacement accompany
BRI projects [167–169]. The challenge for China is to construct an integrative rather than exploitative
BRI—one that is inclusive of host nations, provides beneficial infrastructure and outcomes, protects the
environment, and is done in such a way that China’s intent and reputation remains intact.
7. Conclusions: Planning for the BRI
Planning and addressing environmental issues associated with the BRI is immensely complex and
multi-scaled. This paper defined BRI and the dimensions of its impacts and drivers. We did this by
proposing a typology of BRI infrastructure, describing the range of impacts on different components
of the Earth system and the economic and socio-political drivers which influence BRI development
and impacts. In addition, we provided a multi-scale, socio-economic-political and environmental
framework for planning and addressing the impacts of BRI.
Understanding the characteristics of impacts of BRI infrastructure on the environment is the
first step for devising policy and plans for addressing its impacts to ensure sustainable development.
The scale of its impacts may appear overwhelming and, given this, there is a tendency to address
BRI in a piecemeal fashion at the project scale or with broad brushstrokes by examining the initiative
in its entirety. However, the cumulative impacts that occur both regionally and globally mean we
cannot take such an approach, particularly if standardised and not context-specific. A multi-scale
approach is required ensuring that BRI is considered at the project scale through an environmental
impact assessment, at the regional scale through strategic environmental assessments, then at the
ecoregion scale (e.g., Central Asia; South East Asia coral reef triangle) and finally at the global scale.
Recent guidelines on the BRI (see References [154,159]) have emphasised the importance of multi-scaled
approaches to implementing the BRI, but have provided little detail about what this means in practice.
Policy makers in China and recipient countries should find the interdisciplinary multi-scale analysis
presented in this paper useful in debates about how the ecological and social impacts of BRI might be
understood and managed.
The implications of BRI go even further, by spurring on other major powers to develop their own
global schemes. For example, India’s alternative is an economic corridor to Russia through Iran and
Central Asia [170], while Russia is integrating Central Asian economies with the Eurasian Economic
Union [171]. Meanwhile, Japanese influence is still strong, with Japan outspending China on road
and railway projects in six Southeast Asian countries [172]. It is important that BRI provides a role
model for dealing with environmental impacts in order to raise the bar for future global infrastructure
development programs and ensure that leading practice environmental standards form an integral
part of any global infrastructure scheme.
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